3 an important policing mechanism of managerial abuses at U.S. public companies. 5 Different types of representative litigation have had their moment in the sun -derivative suits early on, followed by federal securities class actions, and most recently merger litigation-often producing benefits for shareholders, but posing difficult challenges as well. In particular, the benefits are qualified by another concern, the litigation agency costs that surround shareholder suits. This form of agency costs arises since the suits are invariably representative with no requirement that the named plaintiffs have a substantial ownership interest in the corporation, so that their prosecution could be easily seen as lawyer-driven. 6 And that perception is further underscored in the U.S. where the "American Rule," in contrast to the "Loser Pays Rule,"
Introduction
Attention in the typical American corporate law class is riveted on addressing managerial agency costs. Berle and Means 1 popularized the topic by documenting how in the 1930's the ownership of U.S. public companies was separated from their management resulting in a misalignment of utility curves between owners and managers. Within such systems, shareholders engage in a variety of strategies so as to minimize these costs. 2 For example, shareholders may use shareholder voting, the threat of a change of control transaction, performance based-compensation, and litigation, among other things, to discipline managers should they be poor stewards and fail to create shareholder value. Over time, the relative value of these different devices for disciplining managers has ebbed and flowed with the changes in patterns of share ownership and constant evolution in legal rules, both substantive and procedural. 3 Against this paradigm, the corporate law class studies how private suits, whether class actions or derivative suits, are potential tools for controlling managerial agency costs. 4 Many scholars argue that over the past seventy years, shareholder representative litigation has acted as 1 Adolf Berle and Gardner M. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932)(describing not only that the typical public corporate owners were dispersed so that owners' exercise of oversight was seriously limited by high coordination costs that enabled managers to essential hire capital rather than capital retain managers undoubtedly triggered a greater level of engagement between corporate directors and shareholders.
Finally, we consider the rising role of the appraisal remedy against the context developments in shareholder litigation focused on acquisitions. As we will see, the appraisal proceeding, an old and previously largely defunct, form of litigation, has been spruced up by a few intrepid investment groups, who have begun filing these actions in an effort to engage in what some have called "appraisal arbitrage." This new monitoring technique must overcome many hurdles though before it can truly fulfill its promise. We conclude that each one of these new, or revived, monitoring techniques may be able to stand in for representative shareholder litigation during its hour of need to insure that managerial agency costs don't rise too far.
I. The Shifting Landscape of Private Shareholder Litigation
During the past seventy years there have been many shifts among the multiple types of shareholder litigation. Close examination reveals both contraction and expansion with the former involving procedural developments whereas the latter invariably doctrinal innovations. Despite these ebbs and flows, the business community shares the common view that shareholder litigation is vexatious, robust and expanding. As we will see, their concern is partly justified, at least with respect to litigation spawned by acquisitions. In this section, we set forth the significant substantive and procedural developments we argue not only define the realm of shareholder ligation in the U.S. but invite governance to enter where litigation formerly was the sole mechanism for limiting managerial agency costs.
Just as too much fudge can be a problem, too warm an invitation to challenge transactions also has its list of problems. Delaware has innovated, just as it did initially with creating the doctrine inviting suits. Among its substantive innovations was removing from close burdenshifted fairness inquiry freezeouts pursuant to state short-form merger statutes that allow parents to acquire a ninety percent owned subsidiary solely upon the approval of the parent board of directors. 22 More recently, in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 23 the Delaware Supreme Court held that an acquisition involving the dominant stockholder would nonetheless enjoy a presumption of fairness if there is both impartial approval by a majority of the disinterested shareholders of the subsidiary and the subsidiary was represented in the negotiations by a truly independent negotiating committee. Where each of these conditions is met, the transaction enjoys the substantial protections of the Business Judgment Rule that is generally accorded armslength transactions.
Delaware has also innovated procedurally. The most troubling aspect of acquisition litigation captured in the above statistics is not the rise in the rise over time in the percentage of acquisition transactions that are challenged but that the pattern today is that there are multiple suits in multiple forums. When the multiple suits are all in Delaware, this was a manageable problem. For example, simplifying rules such as "first to file," while crude, had the benefit of allowing a court to quickly consolidate the nettlesome suits into one. Thus, while multiple suits have always something of an eyesore to the profession, and particularly the dignity of the litigation bar, it was a manageable one when the suits were in Delaware. However, when the same acquisition triggers multiple suits outside of Delaware, the problem is of a quite different magnitude because of the inherent limits on a single court's jurisdiction to resolve disputes.
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A sobering lesson to be drawn from the explosion of multi forum litigation is illustrated California suit's plaintiff was represented by what Vice-Chancellor Laster described as a "fast filing" "specialized plaintiff's firm" who customarily files suits on a contingency fee basis.
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Much of the opinion on this issue is directed to reviewing the problems that flow from the firstto-file rule, most significantly prompting hasty filings of ill-conceived suits, concluding that "[b]y leaping to litigate without first conducting a meaningful investigation, the California plaintiffs' firms failed to fulfill the fiduciary duties they voluntarily assumed as derivative action plaintiffs." 28 The court thus concluded that preclusion was not in order since the earlier action failed to provide adequate representation for Allergan.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed on both points. The court held that California, and not Delaware, law should determine whether privity is lacking due to the derivative suit's dismissal for the failure to excuse demand on the board of directors. It concluded that under California law, contrary to the approach in Delaware, privity is satisfied even though the suit is dismissed for failure to excuse a demand. The Supreme Court also held that the irrebuttable presumption that fast-filers are inadequate representatives was not justified and, hence, overruled this basis for holding the prior suit did not preclude the Delaware suit.
Central to understanding the significance of Pyott is that the Vice-Chancellor would have excused the demand and disagreed with the California federal court that did not excuse a demand. A close comparison of the complaints in each case support the ruling made by each court. For example, in Allergan the federal court found that the complaint baldly asserted the board's knowledge of off-label promotion solely because the board had knowledge of off-label sales. In contrast, this assertion was more fully developed by the plaintiff in Pyott. There the complaint alleged, among other facts, that the board approved promoting off-label use as part of an overall strategic plan. Similarly, Allergan held the complaint's allegations were too conclusory with respect to the charge that the board ignored marketing wrongdoings; whereas the complaint in Pyott detailed that the board received warnings from the firm's general counsel that off-label use was due to misbehavior in the marketing department and that the board approved a series of strategic plans that involved off-label applications of Botox (as well that board was aware that Botox use was increasing at a far faster rate than on-label use).
A close review of the two opinions supports the view that the complaint before the Delaware court was far more detailed in supporting the central allegations of a Caremark oversight claim than was set forth in the complaint before the federal district court. As such, there was a substantial basis to support Vice-Chancellor Laster's conclusion that sufficient facts were alleged to support reasonable inferences that the directors and officers of Allergan expected to garner increased sales by active promotion of off-label uses of Botox. 29 Of note is that the difference is not with the judge but the quality of the derivative suit counsel. 30 The difference between the two courts is not a dispute over doctrine. of the two judges; instead, it appears that the attorneys pressing the case in California were not equal to those before the Delaware court. As a consequence, the cause of action appears to have been poorly prosecuted in California-a fate that Vice-Chancellor Laster sought to amend.
The inability to correct the error, nonetheless underscores that among the burdens of that multi-forum litigation is not just unevenness across the judiciary but more importantly unevenness across the suits' counsels. This may well reflect the reluctance of some counsel to invest heavily in investigating the facts of the case and devoting time to drafting a complaint if uncertain whether those efforts will be undercut by a swifter proceeding by a rival counsel. If this surmise is correct, it poses a larger concern: this is an arena in which diligence and reflection are ultimately not rewarded but nimbleness and timing.
A further concern that flows from multi-forum litigation is a fear that this could feed a reverse auction; this occurs when a cooperative plaintiff collaborate with the defendant corporation to bring all challenges to a swift resolution by a court-approved low-ball settlement that yields a quick return to the lawyers but fails to protect the interest of the shareholders. 31 Clause of the U.S. Constitution required upholding the global settlement, provided the shareholders' interests were adequately represented. 33 In the background of this matter is the important fact that the two suits were being prosecuted by two competing law firms and that the damages being pursued in the federal district court were of a significantly greater amount that those at play in the Delaware state action. Hence, precedent exists within which a reverse auction can occur, if not thrive.
Matsushita creates the potential for multi-jurisdictional litigation to cause harm in both federal and state court. While there are a variety of potential ways to address these problems, one private ordering antidote for the multiple concerns associated with multi-forum litigation is the forum selection bylaws. 34 These bylaws are adopted solely on the approval of the board of directors and mandate most forms of shareholder suits can only be maintained in a particular forum, generally Delaware.
In 2013, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld a unilaterally director adopted forum selection bylaw, reasoning the bylaws, including the board's authority to adopt bylaws, were an extension of the shareholders' contractual rights to the corporation. 35 More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court similarly reasoned that a bylaw by a non-profit corporation could impose a "loser pays" standard on shareholder litigation. The ultimate step in a board of directors' resort to the bylaws to address feared shareholder suits will be mandated arbitration;
this step remains to be adjudicated in Delaware but is clearly at hand. court to challenge the conduct of the board of directors in mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, the Delaware courts have approved boards adopting bylaws that channel those challenges to Delaware, that discourage such suits' maintenance by shifting costs to the losing party, and that portend sweeping all such disputes behind the veil of arbitration. These new bylaws will most likely lead to less accountability on the part of managers and their boards.
B. Derivative Suits
Traditional derivative cases raise state law breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors and officers. Typically, these claims allege breach of the duties of loyalty (including good faith) and care, as well as other state law issues. They are commonly used to attack directors or officers engaging in conflict of interest transactions with the corporation or taking a corporate opportunity belonging to the corporation. The options backdating scandal, in which a number of large corporations were found to have provided their executives with options to buy stock on dates and terms that were backdated, is a good example. 36 These cases arose after a scandal sparked by academic research and news stories led to government regulatory investigations that revealed wide-ranging misbehavior. In the aftermath of these events, shareholders filed many derivative suits to recover benefits that insiders unjustly obtained from the corporation.
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Derivative suit litigation among the broad group of shareholder suits is the most stable set of cases of all of the representative litigation groups. There has been little change in the underlying set of legal and procedural rules for derivative litigation in the past twenty years. In prior research, one of the authors studied all derivative litigation filed in Delaware during 1999 and
2000
. 38 That article found that Delaware public companies were hit with about 30 cases per year with about 30% of them yielding relief to the corporation or its shareholders, and the remainder being quickly dismissed with little litigation activity. 39 Private Delaware firms were targeted with a dozen lawsuits annually, typically raising claims of minority oppression.
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This research showed that a careful distinction must be made between public and private corporations when discussing the role of shareholder derivative suits. Derivative suits are very much alive and well in the private company setting; in this context they perform their historical function of remedying breaches of duty of loyalty, customarily in the form of acts in bad faith and more particularly self-dealing practices. In the close corporation context, they are better seen as remedying opportunistic behavior by those in control. While opportunistic grabs for assets and business are not foreign to public companies, in the public company context the malefactor is more likely to enjoy the insulation provided by the demand requirement. That is, a major feature of the derivative suit is the requirement that the suit plaintiff must either make a demand on the board of directors or establish a basis why such a demand would be futile. The ultimate outcome in either case depends on whether the board, or a subcommittee of the board, is believed to be sufficiently independent of the suit so that the board or committee's opinion that the suit fails to serve a corporate interest will be upheld by the reviewing court. As a consequence, the robust derivative suit boneyard for public companies is predominantly the handiwork of the demand requirement. In the case of the private corporation, because those disputes are largely between the "ins" and the "outs," the demand requirement is much less lethal because the alleged wrongdoing at the heart of the suit frequently can be more easily linked to a majority of the board. Also shaping the contours of such suits is the wide-adoption of immunity shields whereby a provision in the firm's articles of incorporation insulates directors from liability for misconduct that is not a breach of the duty of loyalty, illegal, in bad faith or a knowing violation of the law.
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Immunity shields thus limit suits focused on alleged managerial failures to those involving knowing and systematic breaches on the part of the board.
While the derivative suit continues to be viable even within public companies, the vitality it enjoys depends very much on what form of managerial agency costs is the target of the suit. that that lack of any performance benchmarks caused had the consequence under section 162(m) of raising the corporation's taxes, the board prospectively modified the plan and the plaintiff dropped her derivative suit. In responding to the derivative suit plaintiff's request for fees incident the claim, XTO Energy's argued that the board was fully aware of section 162(m), but made a conscious decision not to avail itself of section 162(m) because it believed its approach to compensation decision should not "be constrained by such a plan." The court denied any award of fees to the plaintiff because a claim had not been stated; the court reasoned: "[e]ven if the decision were a poor one" as alleged by the plaintiff, "it was not unconscionable or irrational."
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In addition to its' weak substantive standards in the regulation of executive compensation, the derivative suit plaintiff faces typically insurmountable procedural barriers.
Derivative suits challenging an executive's compensation are regularly rejected on the ground of failure to make a demand on the board of directors. Under the orthodox view, demand is excused on grounds of futility, which require evidence that the compensation is so egregious as to be beyond the protection of the business judgment rule, or that the plaintiff has alleged with sufficient particularity that a majority of the board of directors lacks sufficient independence from the suit, or the suit's defendants, to render an impartial decision on whether the suit's continuance would be in the corporation's interest. 50 Moreover, even if a demand is excused on a ground of futility, the board of directors can resurrect its ability to interdict the derivative suit by creating a special litigation committee of independent directors who can thereby provide an 49 XTO, supra at . 50 independent voice on whether the suit's continuance is in the best interests of the company.
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Nonetheless, some courts closely evaluate the committee's reasons supporting any such recommendation, so that the deference normally attendant director decisions is much reduced in the instance of their rejection of a derivative suit's continuation.
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In contrast to the near zero impact on policing executive compensation, derivative suit litigation remains a viable medium within a narrow area within public companies involving selfdealing whether by executives or a dominant shareholder. 53 However, the expected recovery is likely smaller so that standard justifications -expected benefits of the suit are dwarfed by the tangible and intangible costs of its prosecution -in support of a board or committee recommendation that the suit be dismissed could more easily be justified. What remains for the public company derivative suit are so-called "failure to oversee" claims against the board.
Failure to oversee claims find their source in former Chancellor Allen's path breaking The above reasoning appears consistent with observation made in a widely noted Delaware Supreme Court decision that conduct that offends good corporate governance practices nonetheless is not inherently negligent conduct. 57 Thus, not only the immunity shield but more importantly the high standard of fault required to constitute negligence on the part of the directors severely restrict the scope of duty to monitor suits.
C. Federal Securities Class Actions
The story of few trials and many tribulations of federal securities class actions is well were just 94. However, in 2013, there were 100 settlements, the first increase in total settlements to be experienced in years. While these downward declines were occurring, median settlement size has increased from $3.7 million in 1996 to $9.1 million in 2013. This supports the claim that plaintiffs are more discriminating in the cases they file, switching to suits likely to compensate for them for the costs and risks of securities class action litigation that are cataloged below.
The high risk incident to the filing of a securities class action is embodied in a single data point: the pre-trial dismissal rate of filed suits. In 1996, after the year the PSLRA was enacted, there were 42 securities class actions dismissed; whereas, in 2013, in an era when many fewer securities class actions were being filed 79 suits were dismissed. Overall, approximately 42 percent of filed securities class actions are dismissed in response to defendant's motions to dismiss or summary judgment. At the core of these trend lines is the cost curve for the suits' maintenance and those costs have, not surprisingly, been impacted by several legal legislative and judicial developments.
The plaintiffs' bar underwent a substantial face lift with the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. A central provision of the PSLRA was establishing a procedure for the court to select a "lead plaintiff". Before the PSLRA, courts confronted with multiple class action filings for the same disclosure violation invariably followed the protocol of the "first to file" in deciding which filed action would proceed. The PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision provides a procedure for the court to select the "most adequate" shareholder representative to serve as the lead plaintiff from among those petitioning to be selected. The act establishes a rebuttable presumption that the investor with the largest loss is the most adequate plaintiff; as consequence the plaintiff in large post PSLRA securities class actions often is a large financial institution. 58 Because the PSLRA tasks the lead plaintiff with selecting the suit's counsel, a correlative effect of the lead plaintiff provision has been concentration of securities class actions among a few plaintiff firms who have the resources to nurture on-going relationships with many such financial institutions. Less well-connected law firms are now relegated to suits against companies whose market capitalization is less conducive to any institutional presence. Nonetheless, the overall objective of the lead plaintiff provision appears to be largely achieved, namely providing the securities class action lawyer with a real client.
Evidence supports the view that institutional lead plaintiffs address the earlier referenced litigation agency costs of representative suits. Institutions serving as lead plaintiffs are associated with larger settlements, larger percentage recovery relative to provable losses, and pre-suit agreements that yield lower relative fees to the suit's counsel.
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But the PSLRA did more, much more, than burnish the image of the class action lawyer.
It burdened maintenance of the suit with a heightened pleading requirement as well as barring discovery until all motions to dismiss had been resolved. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have long required that a complaint must allege with "particularity" facts supporting an allegation of fraud. The PSLRA added to this the requirement that the alleged facts must establish more likely than not a "strong inference" of fraud. Moreover, until all pretrial motions were resolved, including motions to dismiss in which the "strong inference" standard is applied, no discovery is granted to the plaintiff. Thus, post-PSLRA, the plaintiff no longer could by the mere fiat of filing a complaint gain access to the defendant's records to "fish" for facts that would support with particularity an allegation of fraud. The PSLRA's discovery bar effectively required plaintiff firms to be more resourceful prior to filing suit so that the complaint's factually allegations met the "strong inference" of fraud demanded by the PSLRA. Such resourcefulness in turn demanded plaintiff firms to invest non-trivial sums to investigate possible cases so as to marshal the facts to meet the pleading requirement. Failure to do so met with swift dismissal;
59 Cox and Thomas, Mapping the American Experience, supra note (survey article on securities fraud class actions). fraud class actions. Causality in securities litigation has two distinct components. There is a requirement that the misrepresentation induced the plaintiff to purchase or sell the security. This is generally referred to as transaction causation. As we will see below, the Supreme Court's activity in this realm of causation has been within the procedural context of what guides the decision whether a class action should be certified. Quite distinct from transaction causation is evidence set forth in the complaint that, even though a misrepresentation occurred and transaction causation has been established, the plaintiff must set forth facts supporting the claim the misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to suffer an economic loss. This is commonly referred to as loss causation.
In orthodox settings of fraud where plaintiff and defendant deal directly with one another, transaction causation is addressed by requiring evidence that the plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentation when purchasing or selling the security. efficient market. Thus, plaintiffs can secure class certification on allegations that the material misrepresentation was of the type that more likely than not under the circumstances affected the security's price. Defendants, however, obtained a modest victory by being able to rebut class certification with evidence, such as costly econometric studies, that the alleged misrepresentation did not affect the security's price. It remains too early to determine the overall impact
Halliburton will have in the lower courts.
The Supreme Court has been equally restrictive in the realm of loss causation. Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo 68 held that the plaintiff's complaint must set forth facts supporting the claim that the alleged material misrepresentation caused the plaintiff to suffer a material loss. This requirement is typically satisfied by a factually-supported allegation that once the truthful information was released the stock price underwent a noticeable correction. All too frequently plaintiffs fail to make this showing because either the announcement the plaintiff asserts to be the correction is viewed by the court as not sufficiently aligned with the alleged misrepresentation to be deemed their correction, or the defendant, perhaps artfully, bundles many other items with the corrective statement so that it is not possible to disentangle the correction from other market-moving information contained in the same announcement. In either case, not only do the costs to litigate the case rise as suits customarily devolve into a battle of costly econometric experts but the risks of pursuing the suits rise as well. The result is that much more cherry picking of suits occurs, with the end result that the frequency of survival goes down but the outcome for cases that proceed is likely a greater settlement value. The data above supports each of these beliefs. Despite the significant narrowing of the antifraud provision that has occurred, it indicts the comparative weakness of state law that a rapidly growing area of antifraud private suits are suits that at the core are complaints regarding management stewardship. As seen earlier, state fiduciary duty claims that the directors and officers were poor stewards must confront not only A purely state fiduciary suit on such a claim would not only confront the problems described above, but also would be a derivative claim for which the necessity of a demand on the board or a committee of the board greatly weakens the suit's possibilities. Those problems are currently bypassed in contemporary monitoring suits disguised as failure to disclose cases.
II. Evolving Non-Litigation Monitoring Substitutes
The preceding material supports the conclusion that shareholder litigation has a lessening role in addressing certain types of agency cost. Managerial underperformance is insulated by the business judgment rule, the demand requirement in derivative suits and the immunity shield.
Independent of these bulwarks against the disciplining lash of shareholder suit is the withdrawal courts have taken from regulating executive pay. Finally, although it remains early in the lifecycle of forum selection and arbitration bylaws, they each portend weakening whatever force shareholder suits have had in protecting shareholders in acquisitions.
Coterminous with the before-described constrictions of shareholder litigation, a number of alternative monitoring techniques have developed that address, to some extent, the voids created by the contraction of shareholder suits. We review below these monitoring developments. While each of these methods has its advocates and critics, collectively they have brought about significant changes in the relationship between management and shareholders at American public corporations. In this section, we explore each one of these areas to explain how they are affecting corporate governance today as well as their limits as monitoring devices.
A. Activist Hedge Funds
In recent years, hedge funds have actively engaged many companies in an effort to boost shareholder value. 72 Empirical studies finding that the filing of an activist hedge fund's Schedule 72 Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, supra note .
13D filing creates positive average abnormal returns from 7% to 8%. 73 These benefits appear to last: firms targeted by activists see a 1.22% increase in operating efficiency one year after acquisition. 74 Where do these gains come from?
Target firms are generally undervalued by the market, often because of poor management. In these interventions, hedge funds frequently seek to force companies to pay out dividends or buy back shares as a means of distributing to shareholders "excess cash." In other situation, a hedge fund may seek to persuade target firms to spin off less inefficient divisions or assets, or even force the sale of an entire company. The lead hedge fund will often accumulate 6 to 8% of the target company's stock, which by itself is not enough to give them a strong negotiating position if target management resists their efforts. However, other hedge funds and many less active institutional investors, including some who have direct investments in the lead hedge fund, will vote their shares in the target company in support of the lead hedge fund. 75 Corporate management and their supporters have a less rosy view of hedge fund activism:
they argue that hedge funds are pursuing short term profits at the expense of the long term investors in targeted companies. 76 Some advocates of this position have gone so far as to argue that hedge fund shareholders ought to have fiduciary duties to other shareholders as a check on their allegedly opportunistic conduct. 77 Recent empirical work is inconsistent with the view that hedge fund short-termism is a problem. 78 Moreover, the argument that hedge funds are systematically ripping off long term investors is hard to reconcile with those investors' actions. For one thing, hedge funds seem to have little trouble recruiting institutional investors to support their activist goals. 79 If hedge fund's plans actually only produced a short term gain at the expense of long term profitability, these long term investors would be reluctant to support them. 80 Second, activist hedge fund holding periods average approximately 31 months, which is substantially longer than almost all other investors. 81 Finally, one study of hedge fund interventions from 1994 to 2007 found that the initial stock price gains resulting from the initial announcement of a hedge fund's activism were sustained over a five year period as were improvements in other measures of returns. 82 All of this evidence supports the claim that hedge fund activism is not dominated by short term considerations, but rather generates valuable monitoring of corporate management. 83 Private equity firms interact in important ways with hedge funds and facilitate their activism. One hedge fund strategy that generates substantial shareholder value is persuading targeted firms to put themselves up for sale, often to private equity firms. 84 These sales are generally at a substantial premium over the prior market price and act to discipline management of underperforming companies as well as create ongoing pressure on managers at other firms to aggressively maximize shareholder value.
Private equity firms are also important shareholder monitors in their own right as well. 85 The formation of this control blockholder at newly privatized firms acts to monitor corporate managers to focus their efforts on increasing stock price. 96 Beginning with the U.S. experience, management at many companies made changes to the substance and disclosure of their pay programs in an attempt to more clearly align pay to performance. 97 Many companies revised the content of the CD&A filed with the annual meeting proxy materials. 98 At companies whose pay programs received negative say-on-pay recommendations by proxy advisory firms, management at some firms connected with shareholders following an "against" recommendation. that the precise effects of Say on Pay on executive compensation levels are still being determined.
C. Appraisal Arbitrage
As discussed earlier, merger litigation has played a significant monitoring role in addressing possible agency costs in corporate transactions. Empirical research examining its role at the turn of the millennium found that class action lawsuits challenging the fairness of the consideration paid in M&A transactions had a positive impact on takeover premiums. 104 However, as we discussed in section __ above, merger litigation's future has been placed in jeopardy by the adoption of forum selection bylaws and fee shifting bylaws. If this is true, is there another form of litigation that could take its place?
One possible candidate is appraisal litigation. In an appraisal proceeding, a shareholder can ask a court to determine the fair market value of their shares if they dissent from, or do not vote in favor of, a pending corporate transaction. States vary widely how widely appraisal is available:
states that are more solicitous of shareholders provide appraisal for amendments to the articles of incorporation that adversely affect the rights of stockholders, the sale of all or substantially all the firm's assets, and mergers and consolidations, 105 whereas Delaware limits its appraisal statute to mergers and consolidations, 106 and the Model Business Corporation Act follows a course between these two positions. 107 Traditionally, appraisal has been viewed as an ineffective remedy for shareholders that is cumbersome and very limited in its scope. It has three types of disadvantages that commentators have focused on: 108 difficult procedural steps that must be followed in precise order to preserve one's right to the remedy; 109 the lack of a class action procedure that would permit easy joinder of all dissenting shareholders so that the costs of bringing an action could be more widely While this is certainly possible, we are much more cautious about the effects of this potential trend. First, any monitoring effects on M&A activity that will arise out of appraisal litigation will be limited to small set of deals where appraisal is available. For example, even at the peak of this trend, Korsmo and Myers find that only slightly more than 15% of covered transactions have appraisal actions filed challenging the consideration paid in the deal.
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To the extent that appraisal is effective within this narrow class of deals, we would expect to see controlling shareholders and other acquirers revising existing deal structures to avoid appraisal's reach. This suggests it will be necessary to expand the class of transactions covered by appraisal rights if it is to be truly useful as a monitoring device.
Moreover, appraisal is of value only to large shareholders; small shareholders will not find appraisal to be cost effective generally. Indeed, small investors will benefit, if at all, from 119 Korsmo and Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note, at 17, Figure 3 . 120 Id. at 18. 121 Id. at 28. 122 Id. at 42. 123 Id. at 16, Figure 2 .
this appraisal litigation only if there is an ex ante effect from the potential for appraisal litigation on an acquirers' original pricing of the deal.
Finally, if appraisal litigation is to play a role as a monitor of managerial agency costs in mergers, the market out exception must be eliminated. 124 As numerous critics have pointed out, it makes no sense to say that shareholders who receive marketable securities for their shares in a merger do not need appraisal: if they sell those shares in the market after the merger, then they will suffer an uncompensated loss.
Conclusions
Representative shareholder litigation has enjoyed periods of great repute as well as tough In this paper, we show that these two sets of developments are related. If managerial agency costs begin to spiral upward, investors will seek ways to reduce them. Hedge fund activism is the strongest of these methods at the moment with many well-documented successes, although it is not without its failures. Activism has filled the gap left by the weakening of the market for corporate control after the Delaware courts effectively stopped policing management's use of defensive tactics in hostile takeovers. Say on Pay voting has served 124 Id. at 50.
primarily as a tool to nudge managers to engage with their shareholders over issues related to executive compensation, a function that derivative litigation has shown itself unable to perform.
Finally, appraisal arbitrage holds out the hope of a better remedy for shareholders that are forced to sell their stock in control shareholder squeezeouts. If the Delaware legislature permits these appraisal actions to survive, then appraisal arbitrage would provide shareholders with a means of redress when they are forced to sell their shares too cheaply, a remedy that was largely lost after the Delaware courts decided to apply business judgment standard review in many such transactions.
